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ESSAY
RANKING JUDGES ACCORDING TO CITATION
BIAS (AS A MEANS TO REDUCE BIAS)
Stephen j Choi & G. Mitu Gulati*
INTRODUCTION
Most view the ideal judge as a neutral and unbiased decision
maker; the scales of justice are not supposed to tilt one way or the
other. Judges are not supposed to come to cases with preconceptions
that defendants of a particular race or ethnicity are guilty, securities
fraud lawsuits are frivolous, or that tax fraud cases involve cheats. Rec-
ognizing this view of the ideal judge, candidates for judicial office
tend to assert that they seek to do no more than to serve the public by
applying the law. Invoking this ideal in his confirmation hearings,
Chief Justice John Roberts described his self-conception of a judge's
role as akin to an umpire calling balls and strikes.' Presumably this
@ 2007 Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati. Individuals and nonprofit institutions
may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Murray and Kathleen Bring Professor of Law, New York University and
Professor of Law, Duke University, respectively. Thanks for comments to Scott Baker,
Kimberly Krawiec, Richard Posner, and Un Kyung Park. Thanks to Christopher
Kellett for assisting with data collection. Disclosure: one of the authors clerked for
two of the judges in the sample (Alito and Lynch).
I Associated Press, Text of John Roberts' Opening Statement, USAToDAY.cOM, Sept.
12, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/Washington/2005-09-12-rob-
erts-fulltextx.htm. In his opening statement at his confirmation hearings Roberts
said:
Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way around.
Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them.
The role of an umpire and ajudge is critical. They make sure everybody
plays by the rules.
But it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the
umpire.
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was the conception of a judge that Roberts thought would appeal to
the public; the amount of press that the analogy received suggests that
the strategy worked.2
The problem with the vision of the judge as baseball umpire is
apparent if one talks to a skilled litigator. The litigator will tell you
that a key element of preparing a case is figuring out a judge's biases
and playing to them. 3 Judicial preconceptions and biases are among
the key determinants in a case's outcome, if not the key determinant.
No judge (we hope) holds such a strong preconception that all
defendants of a particular race or ethnicity are guilty or that every
securities fraud lawsuit is frivolous. But judges may not come to every
case with a neutral mindset either. Ajudge may believe that a major-
ity of securities claims are in fact frivolous, coloring how she views any
particular securities case before the court. We confront the question
of how best to create accountability for biases while still allowing for
judicial independence; that is, how to get these biased umpires to
behave in the neutral fashion to which they tell us they aspire.
Politicians select federal judges. And despite the constant politi-
cal rhetoric from both political parties that their selections are merito-
rious and true to the rule of law (or some such amorphous concept
that is supposed to represent neutrality), politicians seem to pick
judges who vote not neutrally, but in line with the ideology of the
politicians picking them. Empirical literature in political science
reports that political affiliation serves as a remarkable predictor of
how a judge will vote in a particular case.4 The more ideologically
Id. For criticism of Roberts's umpire analogy see Edward M. Kennedy, Roberts and
Alito Misled Us, WASH. POST, July 30, 2006, at B1.
2 The headline to the CNN Report on Roberts's statement during his nomina-
tion hearings was Roberts: My Job Is To Call Balls and Strikes and Not To Pitch or Bat,
CNN.coM, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts
.statement/index.html; see also Lorraine Woellert, No One's Kicking Dirt on "Umpire"
Roberts, Bus. Wv. ONLINE, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/
dnflash/sep2005/nf20050913-4305_dbOI6.htm. More humorously, see Jack Shafer,
How the Court Imitates the World Series: John Roberts' Winning Baseball Analogy, SLATE,
Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2126241/.
3 Cf Ahmed Taha, How Litigants Respond to Judges' Political Orientations: An
Empirical Analysis (October, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors)
(finding that judges' political orientations have significant effects on the number of
cases filed by plaintiffs).
4 See ROBERT A. CARP & CLAUDE K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE
FEDERAL Dis-rtawr COuRTS 25-81 (1983); Lee Epstein &Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic
Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead, 53 POL. RES. Q. 625, 639
(2000); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of
Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REv. 301 (2004).
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charged the court case, the better the predictive model works.5 Prior
studies nonetheless have predominantly ignored bias in citations or,
more broadly, judicial reasoning.6 The perspective of these studies
also tends to be relentlessly positive-they study what is happening,
without seeking to influence it.7 In this Essay, we propound two inno-
vations to the study ofjudicial bias. First, we go beyond the prior stud-
ies of voting behavior and introduce a new measure of judicial bias
based on citation practices. Second, we advocate a normative perspec-
tive, arguing that scholars studying the courts should not only
endeavor to identify bias, but also to mitigate bias.
Why look at bias in citations when existing studies already demon-
strate bias in how judges vote in judicial decisions? Judges do more
than vote. They offer reasoning for their decisions and that reasoning
is integrated into the body of precedent that in turn influences the
outcomes of subsequent cases. Examining citation patterns-given
the integral role citations play in the construction of legal arguments
in our system-furnishes a method of analyzing bias in judicial reason-
ing patterns beyond vote analysis. A study of bias in judicial citations
allows testing of how judges reason and create precedent for future
5 See Sunstein et al., supra note 4, at 306-07.
6 Among the exceptions with respect to the analysis of citations are Charles A.
Johnson, Follow-Up Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 W. POL. Q. 538 (1986);
Michael Abramowicz & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Citation to Legislative History: Contex-
tual Theory and Empirical Analysis (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 05-11, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=725919. Johnson reports that ideology does not drive the citation patterns in
his sample of Supreme Court citations to the Court's own past opinions. Johnson,
supra, at 542-43. Nonetheless, precedent should largely drive the choice of citations
to the Supreme Court's own past decisions. Any political bias in judicial citations may
become obscured by the importance of precedent in Johnson's study. Abramowicz
and Tiller look at judicial citations to legislative history, reporting that opinions cite
Republican-generated legislative history more frequently where the deciding panel of
federal circuit court judges is comprised primarily of Republican-appointed judges.
Abramowicz & Tiller, supra (manuscript at 17). Nonetheless, because judges will cite
to legislative history when interpreting a specific statute, the range of possible history
to which to cite is limited. Bias may appear, but again only in limited form in such a
study. More broadly, there have also been some attempts to examine other reasoning
techniques, such as the use of ostensibly neutral canons of statutory construction, for
the presence of bias. SeeJames J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and
the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1, 53-69 (2005).
7 For a discussion of the two divergent strains in the study of judicial behavior,
the positive strain (out of political science) that looks to study what judges do without
trying to influence it and the normative strain (out of the legal academy) that looks to
tell judges what they should do without much understanding of how judges actually
do things, see Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEx. L. REv. 257
(2005).
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judges to follow. Not only does such a study complement the study of
bias in judicial voting patterns, but the study may indicate the pres-
ence of different forms of bias in judicial behavior. Judges, for exam-
ple, may shy away from openly opposing their peer judges in a
particular case but instead, engage in opposition through their opin-
ion reasoning. More perversely, judges who wish to appear unbiased
in more visible activities (such as voting on particular cases) may use
this appearance as "cover" to engage in subtle attempts to shift the
underlying doctrine toward their own viewpoint through their reason-
ing within opinions.
Once measures of judicial bias are developed, such measures not
only may afford us insight into how bias affects judges but also may be
used to moderate the overall level of bias among judges. We cannot
directly regulate judicial behavior without compromising judicial
independence. But we can make the presence of judicial bias more
transparent. Utilizing measures of judicial bias, researchers may rank
individual judges in terms of their biases, thereby setting up a compe-
tition among the judges in terms of bias. Judges care about status and
that status is a function of public perception and respect.8 More spe-
cifically, judges care about fulfilling their roles as neutral deci-
sionmakers, even if hidden in their reasoning patterns are tendencies
to favor particular, narrowly-held ideological viewpoints. 9 In addition
8 See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OFJUICIALB EAVIoR 47-55 (1997); Sidney
A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review
of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1058 (1995) (noting thatjudges desire to
be viewed positively by "fellow jurists, lawyers and the public").
9 Both interviews of judges and judicial biographies suggest that judges care
about "reaching decisions through what feel to them like professionally legitimate
methods." Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence ofJurisprmdential Con-
siderations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & Soc'v
REV. 135, 137 (2006). The following quote from judge Posner is illustrative of the
myriad constraints judges perceive:
THE SUPREME COURT is a political court. The discretion that the jus-
tices exercise can fairly be described as legislative in character, but the con-
ditions under which this "legislature" operates are different from those of
Congress. Lacking electoral legitimacy, yet wielding Zeus's thunderbolt in
the form of the power to invalidate actions of the other branches of govern-
ment as unconstitutional, the justices, to be effective, have to accept certain
limitations on their legislative discretion. They are confined, in Holmes's
words, from molar to molecular motions. And even at the molecular level
the justices have to be able to offer reasoned justifications for departing
from their previous decisions, and to accord a decent respect to public opin-
ion, and to allow room for social experimentation, and to formulate doc-
trines that will provide guidance to lower courts, and to comply with the
1282 [VOL. 82: 3
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to public perception, judges may care about their chances at promo-
tion to a higher court.
If researchers demonstrate that certain judges are making deci-
sions in what looks to be a systematically biased fashion whereas other
judges are not, we venture that the judges who are revealed as more
biased will take steps to reduce the level of bias in their decisionmak-
ing. Put crassly, we propose to harness the power of competition
(here, judges caring about their relative rankings in terms of bias with
other judges) to produce less biased judging. Our premise is that
judges, like the rest of us, are concerned about rankings and respond
to incentives. 10 Many of these individuals played the political and
public perception game exceptionally well, overcoming a host of
other candidates to gain appointment or election as judges in the first
place. That suggests that judges are likely more competitive and more
concerned about public perceptions (and capable of effectively man-
aging those perceptions) than the ordinary individual. There are
exceptions, such as the judges who care only about dispensing justice
and not about public perceptions, who will not respond to the incen-
tives created by a tournament based on the level of judicial bias. But
these are the handful of judges who are presumably unbiased in any
event.
This Essay proceeds as follows: We survey in Part I the prior litera-
ture on ranking judicial performance using citation counts. In Part II,
we discuss why there is value in the examination of biases in citation
counts. In Part III, we report our preliminary attempt to rank judges
in terms of their relative bias levels and to adjust citation counts for
possible bias.
I. BACKGROUND ON RANKINGS AND CITATIONS
Ranking judges in terms of citation counts is not new. Scholars
have been utilizing citation counts to evaluate judicial performance
for over three decades. Some of the most prominent studies in this
vein have originated from judges themselves. Judge Richard Posner
expectations of the legal profession concerning the judicial craft. They have
to be seen to be doing law rather than doing politics.
Richard A. Posner, The Anti-Hero, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 2003, at 27, 30.
10 On the question of whether judges respond to incentives, see RUSSELL SMYrTH,
Do Judges Behave as Homo Economicus, and If So, Can We Measure Their Performance?
An Antipodean Perspective on a Tournament of Judges, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1299, 1302-07,
1325-29 (2005); see also Ahmed E. Taha, Publish or Paris: Evidence of How Judges Spend
Their Time, 6 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2004) (finding evidence suggesting that the
judicial behavior with respect to publication choices is a function of both budget con-
straints and incentives).
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used citation counts in his attempts to quantify judicial greatness in
his biographies of Learned Hand" and Benjamin Cardozo. 12 Judge
Frank Easterbrook employed citation counts to do the converse and
determine the "most insignificant" Supreme Court Justice.' 3 In gen-
eral, scholars have exploited citation counts to render relative evalua-
tions of judicial performance for a variety of purposes, including the
determination of relative influence levels of various judges,1 4 the rela-
tive fitness for promotion to the U.S. Supreme Court of these
judges,' 5 the quality of ABA evaluations of judicial candidates,1 6 the
impact of prior experience in academia on judicial performance,' 7
and the relative influence levels of the various federal circuit courts.1 8
Recently, citation studies, previously the province of academic
debate, shifted to the realm of the national media during the debates
over who should be the next two Justices on the Supreme Court. Dis-
cussions of these quantitative analyses of judicial performance, and
specifically the use of citations to rank judicial performance, found
their way into the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Fox News
Channel, and Legal Affairs, among others.' 9 Such rankings were espe-
cially salient in the context of candidates such as Judge Alito, who had
spent more than fifteen years as a federal circuit court judge prior to
his nomination to the High Court. Using the abundant data on his
1 See Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial
Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511, 534-40 (1994).
12 See Ric- IW A. POSNER, CAR~ozo 74-91 (1990).
13 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most Insignificant Justice: Further Evidence, 50 U.
CI. L. REV. 481, 495-96 (1983).
14 See David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1999); William M. Landes et al.,
Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
271 (1998); Russell Smyth, Who Gets Cited: An Empirical Study of Judicial Prestige in the
High Court, 21 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 7 (2000); Russell Smyth & Mita Bhattacharya, What
Determines Judicial Prestige? An Empirical Analysis forJudges of the Federal Court of Australia,
5 Am. L. & EcoN. REV. 233 (2005).
15 See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An
Empirical Ranking ofJudge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 48-61 (2004).
16 SeeJames Lindgren, Examining the American Bar Association's Ratings of Nominees
to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for Political Bias, 1989-2000, 17J.L. & PoL. 1 (2001);John
Lott, The Judicial Confirmation Process: The Difficulty in Being Smart, 2J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 407, 437 (2005).
17 See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIz. L. REv. 9, 59 (2001).
18 See Landes et al., supra note 14, at 302-05 (providing an analysis of the relative
influence of different federal circuit courts).
19 SeeJohn Lott, Op-Ed., Pulling Rank, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 2006, at A21; Richard
Morin, He's Number 16!, WAsH. POST, Jan. 15, 2006, at B6; Supreme Stats, LEGAL AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 32; Mike Moller, Mr. Smith Locks Up Washington, Fox NEWS.COM,
Apr. 15, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,153120,00.html.
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performance while on the lower court, the public could 
evaluate Alito
relative to other potential candidates for the Court 
who had also been
circuit judges for some meaningful period of time. Indeed, 
a key rea-
son behind the pressure for President George 
W. Bush's prior nomi-
nee to the Supreme Court, Harriet Miers, to 
withdraw was that there
was little basis upon which her fitness for the 
Court could be evaluated
(she had never been ajudge).2 0 By contrast, there existed 
a treasure
trove of information regarding Judge Alito's 
performance as a judge
so that his performance could be 
evaluated relative to his peers.
21
Among the various aspects of Judge Alito's performance 
that received
attention were his citation counts.
2 2
The project of constructing objective measures of judicial 
per-
formance is important for a variety of reasons. 
Judicial behavior is
generally difficult for the public to evaluate. 
Politicians from both
leading parties routinely claim that their favored 
judicial nominees
are objective and not unduly political or partisan. With 
reliable and
objective measures of basic judicial performance, we could 
evaluate
and possibly challenge such claims put forward 
by the politicians. In
addition, these measures may be used in deciding 
judicial promotions
to higher courts, as a source of public pressure 
on the judges to do
better, and as a means of identifying those 
judges who should be
urged to retire.
One threshold problem that many of the studies 
using citation
counts have not considered in depth is the potential 
for bias in cita-
tions.23 If, however, these measures are biased-and 
we provide pre-
20 See Art Buchwald, The Alito Option Play, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 8, 2005, at C3 ("Since
Judge Samuel Alito has been sitting on the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for fifteen years, it is
much easier to know where he stands on the 
constitutional issues that are racking this
country right now. Harriet Miers had no paper 
trail and that is why the right and the
left both opposed her and forced her to 
withdraw her nomination.").
21 See id.
22 See Morin, supra note 19 (reporting on a citation 
study on Alito and other
federal circuit judges by Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati). 
Other aspects of Alito's past
judicial opinion paper trial also made the popular press. 
The New York Times
reported on the pattern of Alito's dissenting 
opinions, as did the New Republic. See,
e.g., Adam Liptak & Jonathan D. Glater, Alito's 
Dissents Show Deference to Lower Courts,
N.Y. TIMFs, Nov. 3, 2005, at Al (referencing separate 
studies by Frank Cross and Cass
Sunstein); Cass R. Sunstein, The Key Question for Alito. 
Same Difference, NEw REPUBLIC
ONLINE, Jan. 9, 2006, http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w060
1 0 9 &s=sunsteinOI0906.
23 See Klein & Morrisroe, supra note 14, 
at 387-88 (finding insignificant evidence
of bias in invocations); Landes et al., supra note 14, 
at 325 (finding insignificant evi-
dence of bias in citations); Russell Smyth & Mita Bhattacharya, 
The Determinants of
Judicial Prestige and Influence: Some Empirical Evidence From 
the High Court of Australia, 30
J. LEGAL STUD. 223 (2001) (using citation counts as 
a measure of influence for Austra-
lian judges and reporting that the Conservative judges 
tend to receive more citations
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liminary evidence that bias does exist-what does one do? One
response is to condemn all attempts to measure judicial performance
or quality using citation counts as doomed to failure.2 4 We urge an
alternative perspective: discovery of bias may be a boon rather than a
curse. If there is bias, then this finding has the potential to unearth a
wealth of information to be exploited both to rank judges based on
bias and to affect judicial behavior in order to reduce the incentive to
engage in biased decisionmaking. In the remainder of this Essay, we
explore the value of measuring the degree of citation bias demon-
strated by individual judges and introduce a sample ranking of judges
according to citation bias.
1I. THE VALUE TO UNEARTHING CITATION BIASES
What exactly is judicial bias and how does this relate to studying
bias in citation practices? Judges (together with their clerks) make
the decision to cite particular cases based on a number of different
motivations. Ajudge may cite a particular opinion because it contains
precedential value, particularly for opinions from a court within the
same circuit as the judge. Judges may also cite opinions for their rea-
soning, insightfulness, and ability to bolster the judges' own views.
Citations may also occur more frequently to judges with whom a par-
ticular judge feels greater affinity based on friendship, past shared
experiences, and so on.
Given this panoply of reasons to cite another opinion, we need
caution in defining judicial bias (and even here, it is not clear that all
bias is bad). We focus primarily on whether political bias exists in how
judges engage in citation practices. One problem with focusing on
political bias is that judges are supposed to have an ideology. Ajudge
may cite a particular subset of other judges because they espouse a
similar view on judicial restraint. Orjudges may hold a common view
on how to interpret the scope of religious freedoms. It is not clear
that the foregoing citation rationales are "bad." Nonetheless, there
are at least three reasons why unearthing citation biases and ranking
judges based on those biases could add value.
First, determining how much political ideology and the precise
type of ideology that affects a judge's opinions provides not only
than Labor appointees). The Klein & Morrisroe, Landes et al., and Smyth & Bhatta-
charya studies look at the aggregate number of citations a particular judge receives
and do not look at how a judge decides when to cite another opinion on a case-by-
case basis.
24 Many of those in legal academia providing comments for our project in assess-
ing bias in judicial citations made this observation.
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insight into how a judge thinks but also transparency. The empirical
literature on judicial bias has almost exclusively focused on measuring
bias in case outcomes (that is, bias in voting as opposed to reason-
ing).25 Unlike prior studies focusing on voting behavior, our method
of measuring bias through citations gets us closer to being able to
measure bias in the construction of precedent. Second, others have
used citation counts as an independent measure of the "quality" of a
judge. 26 The theory behind this quality measure is that other judges
cite a particular judge because of the high value of her opinion. But if
citations instead occur because of ideology or some other reason
besides the high value of the opinion, then this undermines the value
of using citation counts as a measure of quality. If citation counts are
biased, then the next step in the project of improving existing mea-
sures of judicial performance should be to de-bias those counts.
Third, the measurement of bias has the potential to alter judicial
behavior in a fashion that improves the judicial decisionmaking pro-
cess. If judges know their behavior is being scrutinized for signs of
bias, then they will exercise more self-scrutiny for signs of bias-partic-
ularly where the bias involves narrowly-held ideologies that judges are
reluctant to publicize.
A. The Importance of Measuring Judicial Bias
Judges who act based on ideology in their citation practices may
not necessarily pose a problem. Some judges may cite the same group
of judges because they value the particular judicial philosophy of this
group of judges. It is the rare judge who does not hold a jurispru-
dence in how to decide court decisions. Nonetheless, we can divide
ideologies into widely-held and narrowly-held ideologies. We assert
that judges, when deciding cases, would rather appear as if their deci-
sions were decided using widely-held rather than narrowly-held ideol-
ogies. Appealing to widely-held ideologies casts the judge in a
favorable light among other judges and the public. Fewjudges like to
appear as lacking in impartiality, a widely-held goal of judging. As a
result, judges may make decisions based on one type of narrowly-held
ideology or political leaning but nonetheless not want to advertise to
the world that they hold this bias. Deciding a case based on judicial
restraint is one thing. Referring to judicial restraint while deciding
based on more narrowly-held political beliefs is another thing.
25 See Abramowicz & Tiller, supra note 6 (manuscript at 9-12) (describing the
existing literature on judicial bias and the focus on the analysis of voting behavior-
the Abramowicz & Tiller study being among the handful of exceptions).
26 See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
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Studying the extent to which a judge associates systematically
(through citation practices) with particular subsets of judges having
similar political persuasions may help reveal the extent to which oth-
erwise hidden political bias affects decisionmaking. Judges would pre-
fer that outsiders believe that their decisions are decided based on
broadly-held philosophies based on judicial restraint, social welfare,
impartiality, and so on. But if their opinions consistently contain rea-
soning that refers to citations from a specific subset ofjudges all hold-
ing the same narrowly-held ideologies, one can wonder what is really
driving the judges' decisions. Uncovering the importance of political
affiliation provides transparency in just how much political bias mat-
ters. Such transparency can be useful in evaluating a judge for a
higher position, such as U.S. Supreme Court Justice. If a judge dis-
plays a prominent tendency to side with judges of the same political
party for all types of decisions, one can wonder whether the judge was
selected for her fair-mindedness, intelligence, and so on or, in the
alternative, was selected because she passed a political litmus test.
Evidence on bias in citations also has the potential to shed light
on circuit norms. Commentators have observed that the different cir-
cuits appear to develop varying norms of behavior (e.g., publishing a
large number of opinions, hearing oral arguments infrequently, dis-
senting a lot).27 These norms, to the extent they are present, should
also appear in citation data. For example, other things equal, we
might find that judges on certain circuits tend to cite proportionately
from judges of both political parties whereas judges on other circuits
might tend to display more bias in their citation practices.
One challenge in measuring judicial bias is the matter of quanti-
fying the extent of bias. Thus far, scholars seeking to measure bias
have looked primarily at voting behavior.2 8 For example, judges vot-
ing in favor of plaintiffs seeking to have evidence excluded in Fourth
Amendment challenges to a police search may be coded as liberal and
those voting the other way may be coded as conservative. Similarly,
judges voting in favor of allowing the state to endorse religious sym-
bolism (for example, allowing a creche or a nativity scene to be placed
in a federal court house) may be coded as conservative and those vot-
ing against it as liberal. Bias in voting can also be measured as a func-
tion of dissenting votes. Judges who only dissent against others from
the opposite political party may be seen as more partisan or biased
27 See Stefanie Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and
Effects of Decision Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RicH. L. REv. (forth-
coming 2007).
28 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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than those who dissent equally against judges from both party
backgrounds.
There is, however, a limitation on vote-based measures of judicial
bias. Voting on individual cases comprises only part of what judges do
in a case. Judges also promulgate written statements of reasons for
their decisions and those opinions, in turn, become part of the body
of precedent that influences later cases. Examining voting patterns
alone provides an incomplete measure of what judges are doing
because it focuses only on the judge's preferences in the current case.
Put differently, one is only measuring the presence of bias vis-At-vis the
current case. But, at least at the appellate level, the current case is
rarely the sole focus ofjudges. Instead, their concern is often with the
creation of precedent that will influence later cases.
Bias may also more readily reveal itself in citations and the crea-
tion of precedent than in judicial voting patterns. How a judge votes
is visible and subject to immediate public scrutiny; how a judge rea-
sons within an opinion is more obscure to the general public. Read-
ing and digesting the reasoning of a particular opinion takes effort
and expertise, not only in understanding legal reasoning but also in
connecting how one case interacts with the line of prior cases in a
particular area of the law. A judge, for example, might vote to allow
for a certain piece of evidence to be excluded under the Fourth
Amendment because the police behaved in a horrendous manner,
but might then also write her opinion in a fashion that permits the
police in the future to engage in highly invasive searches and seizures
with no more than minimal justification. A vote-based coding would
count such an outcome as liberal because it would be ignoring the
information contained in the creation of precedent. Focusing only on
the votes, as in prior studies, misses what judges on courts like the
federal circuit courts and the U.S. Supreme Court see as a primary
task, that of the creation of precedent, and the bias involved in this
effort.29
To summarize, looking at citation bias provides a step toward
bridging the gap between the vote counting (political scientists) and
precedent reading (legal academics). The analysis of citation pat-
terns, we suggest, provides a numerical method of examining judicial
reasoning patterns for bias.
29 For a detailed exposition of this point, see MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE PRISM OF
PRECEDENT (forthcoming 2007).
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B. De-Biasing Citation Counts
Determining the amount of political (and other) bias that affects
citation practices is also important in validating a practice common
among researchers: using citation counts as a measure of a particular
judge's "quality." The premise behind using citation counts to mea-
sure judicial quality is that judges choose to cite the opinions of other
judges when they think that the discussions of a particular point by
those other judges will support or illuminate their reasoning. 30 In
other words, well-reasoned opinions will get cited and badly reasoned
opinions will get ignored. Judges who write higher quality opinions-
where the proxy for opinion quality is the quality of reasoning-will,
over significant periods of time, systematically accumulate higher
numbers of citations than those who write lower quality opinions.
The measure will not be perfect because badly reasoned opinions will
sometimes get a lot of cites because they happen to be the first ones to
analyze a particularly salient issue and well-reasoned opinions will
sometimes get ignored because they tackle obscure topics. 31 Over
long enough periods of time, assuming that judges all tackle a similar
variety of issues, these subject matter differences should even out.
Citation counts as a measure of judicial quality suffer from an
understudied flaw: bias. Instead of the well-reasoned opinions being
cited more frequently, perhaps judges primarily cite their social
acquaintances, those who attended the same law schools that they did,
or those of the same race and gender. Perhaps judges tend to cite
those who share their political leanings or judges with longer tenure
who have already established reputations. Concretely, if Richard Pos-
ner's citations primarily come from other Republican judges and if
those other judges primarily cite Richard Posner because he is also a
Republican judge, then a count of Richard Posner's citations would
not be measuring the quality of his opinions. Instead, it would be
30 For a discussion on the value of using citation counts as a measure ofjudicial
influence or quality see Landes et al., supra note 14, at 271-72.
31 In addition, there is the issue of whether some badly reasoned opinions get
cited a lot because others are distancing themselves from the bad opinion. Negative
citations are not the same as positive citations. In a prior study, we ranked federal
circuit court judges based on their citation counts (looking at the aggregate number
of citations to each judge's top twenty citation-receiving opinions). We then looked at
the top ten judges in terms of citation counts and determined what fraction of the
citations to their top twenty citation-receiving opinions constituted negative citations.
Not only did we find that negative citations comprised only a small fraction (8.9%) of
the total citations, we also found that there was no significant difference between the
fraction of negative citations for the top ten judges and the median eleven judges in
our sample. See Choi & Gulai, supra note 15, at 56-57.
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measuring his Republicanism. And comparing Richard Posner's cita-
tion counts to those of his Seventh Circuit colleague, Frank Easter-
brook, would arguably be measuring their relative Republican
credentials, rather than the relative quality of their opinions. In sum,
there is an array of ways in which citation counts might be biased. If
citation counts measure bias rather than quality of reasoning, that sug-
gests a flaw in the studies that have used these counts to measure judi-
cial quality or reputation.
Recognizing that bias may exist in the form of what cases a judge
chooses to cite to support her legal reasoning gives scholars the ability
to correct their existing citation counts for such bias. If the data on
citation counts can be adjusted for bias, then the clean data should
provide a good measure of opinion quality. To go back to the Posner
example, maybe what we need to do is to measure only the citations to
Posner by Democratic judges. If it turns out that Democratic judges
cite Posner more than they cite any other judge, that may indicate
something significant (for example, despite the fact that the Demo-
crats may not agree with his political views, they still find the quality of
his reasoning compelling enough that it is useful to cite him). Or
maybe one could look at his cites in relatively apolitical areas like tax
law; if he gets a lot of cites in those cases, we might be able to say
confidently that Posner's high citation counts are not due to political
factors. To reiterate, once we identify the presence of various biases,
we may use this information as a starting point from which we can
begin de-biasing the data to provide accurate measures of judicial
performance.
C. The Games that Judges (May) Play
The two points made previously, about quantifying the presence
of bias generally among judges and debiasing citation counts as a mea-
sure of judicial quality, are important. But they are but the building
blocks for the normative point that our Essay advances. The judicial
system would benefit if judges are forced to think about the question
of whether they are biased and are given incentives to alter their
behavior toward reducing biases that they otherwise would not want
widely known to the public. Judges may not mind if they are ranked
highly in terms of espousing widely (but perhaps not universally) held
ideologies, such as judicial restraint. On the other hand, citation bias
rankings may reveal that a judge tends to cite a subset of other judges
known for their particular, narrowly-held ideological views on abor-
tion or some other hot button issue. Once judges realize that their
previously covert, narrowly-held ideological or other biases will lower
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their standing relative to other judges and the general public (in turn
reducing the judges' chances at promotion to a higher court), such
judges may engage in less biased judicial reasoning and citation prac-
tices. More benignly, judges may simply not realize the extent to
which they exhibit certain biases; awareness, in turn, may help allevi-
ate the influence of the biases.32
Ranking judges based on judicial bias in citation practices also
benefits those who seek to use citation count measures as a proxy for
judicial quality. One critique of using citation counts as a proxy for
quality is that it will negatively affect judicial behavior. Judges will
start paying attention to which opinions they cite and will henceforth
cite more frequently to their friends, family and political affiliates (in
an effort to receive reciprocal citations to boost their own citation
counts). f judges do indeed pay attention to citation count rankings
and alter their behavior in response-as these critics, some of whom
are prominent judges, 33 seem to assert they will-one solution is to
32 The point that increasing accountability can reduce bias is backed up by a
large body of literature, much of it pioneered by Philip Tetlock. The basic finding is
that self-critical thinking is most likely to be activated where " (a) suboptimal perform-
ance result[s] from lack of self-critical attention to the judgment process and (b)
improvement require[s] no special training in formal decision rules, only greater
attention to the information provided." Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tedock,
Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 263 (1999). The
necessary self-critical thinking will take place where the accountability is to an "audi-
ence (a) whose views are unknown, (b) who is interested in accuracy, (c) who is inter-
ested in processes rather than specific outcomes, (d) who is reasonably well-informed,
and (e) who has a legitimate reason for inquiring into the reasons behind partici-
pants' judgments." Id. at 259. As political scientist David Klein points out (in refer-
ence to Tetlock's work), "if we consider the conditions under which accountability
has the best chance of reducing cognitive errors, they appear to be satisfied by the
typical judging experience." David E. Klein, Unspoken Questions in the Rule 32.1 Debate:
Precedent and Psychology in Judging, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1709, 1718-19 (2005).
Accountability though is not a panacea and Lerner and Tetlock caution that 'when
people perceive accountability as illegitimate, such undesired effects as attitude polar-
ization away from the advocated position, decline in intrinsic motivation, and exces-
sive stress are all possible responses." Lerner & Tetlock, supra, at 259.
More broadly, on the point about accountability helping to reduce bias, see Evan
R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1023, 1071-77 (2002) (contend-
ing that awareness of certain biases may reduce the influence of such biases on judi-
cial decisionmaking); Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and the Perseverance of First
Impressions, 46 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 285, 290-91 (1983) (finding that expectations of
accountability may increase a juror's level of attention).
33 See Jay S. Bybee & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Tournament, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 1055, 1068-73 (2005); William P. Marshall, Be Careful What You Wish for: The
Problems with Empirical Rankings as a Method to Select Supreme Court Justices, 78 S. CAL. L.
REV. 119, 132-34 (2004); Bruce M. Selya, Pulling from the Ranks?: Remarks on the Pro-
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measure those responses. Put differently, the project of measuring
judicial quality using citation counts can only be sustained if there is
also a simultaneous project of measuring bias in citations. That sec-
ond project of seeking to detect bias in citation behavior will deter
judicial game-playing as a response to the first project of using citation
counts as a measure of quality.
A ranking based on bias in judicial citations is not without flaws.
Some judges intent on ruling based on certain preconceived ideologi-
cal positions, but wanting to show themselves as unbiased, may con-
tinue to rule according to their preferences, but without as many
citations. Nonetheless, such opinions standing alone with less citation
support will be diminished in their precedence and influence. 4
Judges who take the route of citing fewer opinions naturally limit their
impact on the greater judicial community and legal doctrine.
Certainly, to the extent measures of bias themselves are errone-
ous, judicial behavior may be swayed in the wrong direction. But
assuming that good measures of bias can be produced, the publica-
tion of rankings based on these measures has the potential to alter
and improve judicial behavior in a positive fashion. Demonstrating
that the aggregate data reveal bias might well cause judges to be more
self conscious about the possibility of bias, particularly if the ideology
behind the bias that is revealed is not widely-held or one that others
believe judges should espouse. This self-consciousness in turn may
result in less of this type of narrowly-held bias overall. Measures of
bias need not be exact. Even measures that rank judges with some
degree of accuracy will provide judges an incentive to reduce the
influence of narrowly-held ideologies in their decisionmaking (albeit
not with as high powered incentives as with a completely accurate
proxy for bias).
III. PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To illustrate our point on ranking judges based on bias we pro-
vide an example of how to rank judges according to political bias. We
also report results from one method of de-biasing citation count data.
posed Use of an Objective Judicial Ranking System to Guide the Supreme Court Appointment
Process, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1281, 1295-96 (2005); Lawrence B. Solurn, A Tourna-
ment of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. Ruv. 1365, 1395-99 (2005).
34 Exceptions are possible. Some judges, such as Judge Posner, are known for
writing opinions using minimal numbers of citations and nonetheless are cited fre-
quently for their reasoning. Few, however, have the stature of Judge Posner.
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Our dataset consists of judicial opinions authored by federal cir-
cuit court judges from 1998 to 1999, for two years worth of data.3 We
consider only federal circuit court judges still active as of May 2003
when we started to compile our dataset, giving us ninety-eight federal
judges and 6348 authored opinions. We limit our sample to citations
from 1998 and 1999 opinions authored by the pool of ninety-eight
federal circuit judges to any opinions written by a judge from the same
pool of judges. For each judge, we use the party of the president who
nominated the judge as a proxy for the judge's political party.
A. Ranking Judges Based on Bias
Consider when Judge A cites to a Republican judge. How do we
know whether the citations to Republican judges are driven by bias or
some other motivation? Perhaps Judge A cites to a Republican judge
simply because the pool of available opinions to which Judge A may
cite are mostly authored by Republican judges.
We therefore develop a control for the pool of available opinions
to which a judge may cite. For each judge, we calculate the pool of
citations from the pool of active judges and its relative composition of
Republican- and Democratic-judge authored opinions. For example,
we compare the frequency ofJudge A's citations to Republican judges
with the fraction of the total pool of opinions to which Judge A could
have cited that is comprised of opinions written by Republican judges.
So if Republicanjudge authored opinions consist of fifty percent of
the available pool of opinions andJudge A's actual citations to Repub-
lican judges consist of seventy-five percent of Judge A's total citations
then this provides evidence that Judge A favors Republican judges.
Controlling for discrepancies in the age of opinions is important
in the comparison between actual citations and the pool of citations.
Suppose we were to compare citations by a judge today to another
contemporaneous judge and ajudge from the nineteenth century. In
such a case, one could not weigh equally every opinion of the contem-
poraneous judge and the nineteenth-century judge. Very few of the
nineteenth century judge's opinions, if any, will still have any rele-
vance today. Each of the contemporaneous judge's opinions is more
likely to be cited than the nineteenth-century judge's opinions.3 6
Looking at only the opinions of active federal circuit court judges
(and the citations to this same pool of judges) gives us a cohort of
35 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 15, at 32.
36 On the depreciation of an opinion's citeworthiness, see Tom Smith, The Web of
Law 35-36 (Univ. of S.D. Sch. of Law, S.D. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-11,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=642863.
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judges where the discrepancies in the age of opinions to which judges
may cite are not great (from a relative perspective). Limiting our sam-
ple to only active judges creates a relatively level playing field in assess-
ing citation patterns for different judges.
We code for whether a judge cites to judges who are of a different
political party. We limit our citations to citations to outside circuit
opinions. Citations to inside circuit opinions are often driven by pre-
cedent and give judges less leeway to cite according to their prefer-
ences. We obtain 3072 opinions in our dataset where a judge cites to
at least one outside circuit judge in our sample of ninety-eight active
federal circuit courtjudges. To construct an initial political bias indi-
cator, we compute the difference between the actual mean fraction of
citations to a different political party in a particular judge's opinions
(Opposite-Party) and the pool of opinions authored by opposite
political party judges as a fraction of the pool of all opinions
(Pool-Opposite). Under this, measure of political bias, a score closer
to zero indicates a judge more neutral in her citation patterns. Table
1 reports the top fifteen judges from our sample ranked based on the
absolute value of the political bias measure.
TABLE 1. FWrTEEN JUDGES WITH THE LowEST
POLuTcAL BtAS MEAsuRE ScoRE
Mean
Opposite_ Party
Judge Party Circuit -PoolOpposite
Ripple Republican 7 -0.0007
Carnes Republican 11 -0.0007
Black Republican 11 -0.0031
Easterbrook Republican 7 0.0047
Moore Democrat 6 -0.0055
Alito Republican 3 -0.0059
Arnold Republican 8 -0.0060
Smith Republican 5 0.0060
Edmondson Republican 11 -0.0066
Rogers Democrat 12 0.0069
Posner Republican 7 -0.0081
Seymour Democrat .10 -0.0082
Cole Democrat 6 0.0083
Manion Republican 7 0.0085
Henry Democrat 10 -0.0112
Note: Analysis performed for only outside circuit citations and pool of outside
circuit opinions.
* Political bias is measured as the absolute value of the mean Opposite-Party
minus PoolOpposite score for each judge.
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A couple of things stand out from Table 1. First, the Seventh
Circuit is well represented (four of the top fifteen most neutral judges
are from this Circuit). The question then is whether there is some
dynamic on the Seventh Circuit that produces more neutrality in
opinion creation. Prior research has shown that the judges of this
circuit are unusually productive and efficient. 37 Perhaps efficiency
and productivity also translate into neutrality. Second, three Republi-
can judges who have often been characterized as partisan-Posner,
Easterbrook, and Alito-show up as highly neutral in terms of their
citation practices. Alito's numbers are especially interesting given that
many painted him as highly conservative during his confirmation
hearings. We find that Alito seems to have drawn authority relatively
evenly from both his Republican and Democratic colleagues.
Table 2 reports the bottom fifteen federal circuit court judges
from our sample ranked based on the absolute value of the political
bias measure. We provide the ranking for our entire sample of ninety-
eight active judges in the Appendix.
TABLE 2. FIFTEEN JUDGES WITH THE HiGHEST
POLITIcAL BIAS MEASURE ScoRE
Mean
OppositejParty
Judge Party Circuit -PooL Opposite
Thomas Democrat 9 -0.2755
Nelson Republican 9 -0.1995
Widener Republican 4 -0.1903
Schroeder Democrat 9 -0.1782
Anderson Democrat 11 0.1691
Tashima Democrat 9 -0.1545
Higginbotham Republican 5 0.1513
Calabresi Democrat 2 -0.1399
Pregerson Democrat 9 -0.1255
Daughtrey Democrat 6 -0.1232
Dubina Republican 11 0.1198
Williams Republican 4 -0.1085
Kozinski Republican 9 -0.1070
Sloviter Democrat 3 -0.1049
Kelly Republican 10 0.1048
Note: Analysis performed for only outside circuit citations and pool of outside
circuit opinions.
37 See Lindquist, supra note 27 (manuscript at 15).
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Note from Table 2 that the Ninth Circuit now stands 
out, with
four members of the group of least neutral judges coming from 
this
circuit (and none from the Seventh). Perhaps the size of the 
Ninth
Circuit produces a higher amount of polarization 
than with other cir-
cuits. Aside from circuit comparisons, there are 
individual names
here that were surprises to us: Calabresi and Kozinksi. 
These are two
of the most respected and high profile judges in the nation (Calabresi
having been a celebrated academic and the dean 
of the Yale Law
School). As we will see later though, our results in Table 
2 do not
necessarily mean that Calabresi's opinions are not 
valued by Opposite
Party judges.
Still other ways exist to rank judges. One alternative is to rank
judges relative to other judges of the same political party. 
Which
Republican judges tend to cite predominantly to other Republican
judges and which ones tend to spread their citations more broadly 
to
all judges? Focusing solely on Republican (or Democratic) judges
allows for a relative ranking that filters out the 
influence of any partic-
ular Republican-wide methodology that results in more citations by
Republican judges back to other Republican judges following 
the
same common methodology. If a Republican judge chooses 
to avoid
citing Democratic judges far more than the median Republican judge,
this indicates that the (high) level of bias for that particular 
Republi-
can judge is due to something other than just a general desire 
to fol-
low a judicial methodology common to all Republican judges. 
If
Judge X turns out to cite other Republican judges eighty percent 
of
the time, whereas her other Republican colleagues 
cite other Republi-
cans only fifty-five percent of the time, this suggests 
that Judge X's
citations may reflect some more narrowly-held 
ideological
motivations.
Reported in the Appendix, we provide a separate 
ranking of both
Republican and Democratic judges based on the difference between
our measure of political bias (the mean OppositeParty-
Pool-Opposite score) for each judge and the median judge. 
Note
that three of the top five Democratic judges most inclined 
to cite
other Democratic judges are from the Ninth Circuit (Thomas, Schroe-
der, and Tashima). Two of the top five Republican judges 
most
inclined to cite other Republican judges are also from the Ninth 
Cir-
cuit (Nelson and Kozinski). This result may indicate greater 
polariza-
tion along party lines in the Ninth Circuit compared 
with other
circuits.
Our initial rankings are crude. We do not control 
for a number
of factors that may explain a citation pattern that favors 
(or disfavors)
opposite party judges other than ideological bias. For example, other
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biases may matter, including those based on age, race, gender, and
law school cohort. In addition, judges with a particular position, such
as chief judge, may act differently than other judges. 38 The particular
subject matter may also make a difference. Judges may take more par-
tisan positions in opinions dealing with "hot button" issues, such as
civil rights. We leave more detailed analysis of bias for later research.
The thrust of this portion of our Essay is that a ranking of judges
based on citation bias is possible.
B. Adjusting Citation Counts for Bias
Once we recognize that ideological and other biases affect the
citation practices of judges, we consider the question of whether it is
still possible to rank judges using citation counts as a measure of qual-
ity. More citations to a particular judge's opinions may represent the
ideological purity of that judge's opinions rather than value of the
opinion for its reasoning or quality. Of course, some may say that
ideological purity is the equivalent of quality. So long as not all hold
this position though, there is value in separating how a judge ranks in
terms of bias and in terms of non-bias-related factors.
As an example of how one can construct a ranking based on non-
bias-related factors, we examine ideological bias once again. Our ini-
tial strategy to eliminate bias in citation counts is to look at the num-
ber of opposite party citations. We assume that a Democratic judge
will cite to a Republican judge not for partisan reasons, but rather due
to some other quality of the Republican judge's opinions. For each
judge in our sample, we calculate the total number of citations from
opposite party authored opinions from 1998 to 1999 to any of the
judge in question's opinions ("TotalOppositePartyCitations").
Table 3 reports the top fifteen judges ranked based on the Opposite
Party Citation measure.
38 See Virginia Hettinger et al., The Role and Impact of Chief fudges on the United
States Courts of Appeals, 24 JUST. Svs. J. 91, 100-01 (2003).
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TABLE 3. Top FIFTEEN JUDGES RANKED BASED ON
OPPOSITE PARTY CITATIONS
Total Opposite
Judge Party Circuit 
Party Citations
Posner Republican 7 
186
Selya Republican 1 
106
Easterbrook Republican 7 
102
Flaum Republican 7 
100
Reinhardt Democrat 9 
78
Seymour Democrat 10 
71
Sloviter Democrat 3 
69
Anderson Democrat 11 
66
Martin Democrat 6 
66
Edwards Democrat 12 
63
Wilkinson Republican 4 
58
Manion Republican 7 
54
Torruella Republican 1 
54
Coffey Republican 7 
54
King I Democrat 5 
53
Note: Analysis performed for only outside circuit citations 
and pool of
outside circuit opinions.
Richard Posner, who shows at the top of almost 
every citation
ranking of either judges or legal academics, shows up at the 
top in
Table 3. In the two-year period that we examined, 
he had 186 cita-
tions from Opposite Party judges. The next highest number 
is for
Bruce Selya, who had 106. That is, a difference 
of eighty citations
between Posner and Selya. We get a sense 
of Posner's dominance
from the fact that this difference alone would 
have been enough to
take the fifth spot on the current list (Flaum, with seventy-eight 
Oppo-
site Party citations is fifth on the list).
At least two problems exist with the de-biased 
ranking based on
outside circuit citations from opposite party judges in Table 3. First,
even after limiting our sample to active judges, some judges 
may have
a larger stock of opinions than others. Posner, 
for example, authored
1654 opinions prior to 2000. In contrast, 
Hull authored forty-one
opinions. Posner may receive more citations 
simply because of the
larger number of his opinions. Second, the 
pool of opposite party
judge authored opinions differs for Democratic and 
Republican
judges. There are more Republican judges in our sample. 
A Demo-
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cratic judge may receive a greater absolute number of opposite party
citations to her opinions simply due to the larger number of citation
chances due to the greater number of Republican authored opinions.
We adjust the Total-OppositePartyCitations in two ways to take
into account these problems. First, we divide the TotalOpposite
Party-Citations by the number of opinions authored by the judge in
question. Second, we then divide the resulting ratio by the number of
opinions in the pool of opposite party authored opinions. These two
manipulations give us the average number of opposite party citations
per opinion authored by an opposite party judge to each opinion
authored by the judge in question. To make the ranking number
more manageable, we multiply it by 100,000, yielding the
Adjusted-Opposite Party citation number. Table 4 reports the top fif-
teen judges ranked based on the AdjustedOppositejParty number.
TABLE 4. Top FIFrEEN JUDGES RANKED BASED ON
ADJUSTED OPPOSITE PARTY CITATIONS
Pool of
Pool of Opinions
Opinions Authored
Adjusted Opposite Authored by Opposite
Opposite Party by Judge in Party
fudge Party Circuit Party Citations Question Judges
Jacobs Republican 2 8.0275 41 239 2137
Cabranes Democrat 2 7.6682 38 127 3902
Calabresi Democrat 2 7.3927 45 156 3902
Lynch Democrat 1 7.2918 45 16! 3763
Selya Republican 1 6.5901 106 720 2234
Hull Democrat 11 6.5548 10 41 3721
Scirica Republican 3 6.5405 34 240 2166
Moore Democrat 6 6.5060 46 180 3928
Walker Republican 2 6.0065 43 335 2137
Garza Republican 5 5.9801 44 357 2061
Evans Democrat 7 5.7821 42 238 3052
Thomas Democrat 9 5.5000 17 83 3724
Alito Republican 3 5.4188 25 213 2166
Posner Republican 7 5.3961 186 1654 2084
Nelson Republican 9 5,3856 22 211 1936
Note: Analysis performed
circuit opinions.
for only outside circuit citations and pool of outside
We see in Table 4 much greater variance in experience levels
among judges than in Table 3. Judges Lynch and Calabresi, who have
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been on the bench for significantly less time than Posner or Selya,
now also appear in the top fifteen. Calabresi's numbers are particu-
larly interesting because Table 2 reported him among the least neu-
tral judges in terms of citation practices. In Table 4 though, we see
that Calabresi's opinions are still respected enough that he is among
those cited the most by those in the Opposite Party. The numbers for
Calabresi tell us that we should be cautious in inferring too much
about the bias in ajudge's citation practices. On the other hand, Cala-
bresi, because of his intellectual stature, may be an anomaly. Also
interesting is that Alito shows up Table 4, indicating that not only does
Alito tend to cite relatively evenly to judges from both parties (as we
saw in Table 1), but that judges from the Opposite Party (Democrat
appointed judges in the case of Alito) tend to cite Alito frequently.
Our crude ranking based on a de-biased measure of citation
counts is subject to some flaws. It is possible that a Democratic judge
may cite more to Republican judges because the Democratic judge is
subject to review from a higher court (in this case the Supreme Court)
comprised of a majority of Republican-appointed judges. It is also
possible that some Democratic judges cite a lot to Republican judges
because they are cantankerous and simply like explaining why the
Republican judges are wrong (in other words, maybe the cross party
cites are largely negative citations). Ideological bias may also matter
more for particular subject matter categories (civil rights more so than
tax law for example) and the degree of de-biasing we undertake
should take these differences into account.
Solutions to these flaws are possible. We can imagine examining
citation practices in cases where a reviewing court is comprised of
more same- or opposite-party judges to determine whether this makes
a difference (and the magnitude of the difference). If a difference
does exist, citation counts could be adjusted to take into account the
composition of a higher reviewing court. The negative citation prob-
lem is even more straightforward to correct; one needs to count the
fraction of cites for a judge that are negative (as it turns out, prior
research suggests that federal courts of appeals judges only make neg-
ative citations on rare occasions39 ). Finally, on the subject matter
issue, studies may attempt to examine citation practices broken out by
subject matter categories, determining the extent to which certain
39 See Peter McCormick, The Supreme Court Cites the Supreme Court: Follow-Up Cita-
tion on the Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-1993, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 453, 462 (1996)
(finding, for the Supreme Court of Canada, that less than one half of one percent of
all judicial citations are critical); see also Choi & Gulati, supra note 15, at 56-57
(reporting that for the top ten judges in terms of citation counts to the top twenty
citation-receiving opinions, only 8.9% of the citations were negative citations).
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subject matter categories are affected by bias and adjusting citation
counts accordingly. Our point is to demonstrate that adjusting for
bias is possible and to argue that, with refinement, such de-biased cita-
tion counts can prove valuable in measuring judicial quality.
CONCLUSION
Judges make decisions based on a number of reasons. Examining
the judicial opinions to which ajudge cites, particularly out-of-jurisdic-
tion opinions that are not cited for precedential value, divulges much
about the judge's reasoning. Studying citation patterns may help to
expose whether political (and other) types of biases influence judicial
decisionmaking. While judges may desire that the public view their
decisionmaking as based on broadly-held principles of judicial
restraint and neutrality, a citation practice analysis may reveal that par-
ticular judges in fact base their decisions on more narrowly-held ideo-
logical views.
Making the presence ofjudicial bias based on narrowly-held ideo-
logical beliefs transparent provides benefits. For those researchers
that rely on citation counts as a measure ofjudicial quality, identifying
bias in citations provides a cautionary note in relying too heavily on
this quality measure. Researchers may wish to employ various de-bias-
ing strategies to cleanse citation count data of bias. More importantly,
disclosing judicial bias may pressure judges not to engage in such
practices. Judges that care about their public appearance and their
potential for future promotion to higher courts may then adjust their
decisionmaking to reflect a lower level of narrowly-held ideological
bias.
This Essay is but a starting point in the examination of judicial
bias in citation patterns. Our hope is that our initial rankings based
on bias will serve as an impetus both for critiques of our crude attempt
and for the development of better methods of measuring judicial bias.
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APPENDIX
RANKING OF ALL NINETY-EIGHT ACTIVE JUDGES IN OUR SAMPLE BASED
ON THE ABSOLUTE DISTANCE TO ZERO OF THE POLITICAL
BIAS MEASURE
Mean
OppositeParty
Judge Party Circuit -Pool Opposite
Ripple Republican 7 -0.0007
Carnes Republican 11 -0.0007
Black Republican 11 -0.0031
Easterbrook Republican 7 0.0047
Moore Democrat 6 -0.0055
Alito Republican 3 -0.0059
Arnold Republican 8 -0.0060
Smith Republican 5 0.0060
Edmondson Republican 11 -0.0066
Rogers Democrat 12 0.0069
Posner Republican 7 -0.0081
Seymour Democrat 10 -0.0082
Cole Democrat 6 0.0083
Manion Republican 7 0.0085
Henry Democrat 10 -0.0112
Kleinfeld Republican 9 -0.0120
Briscoe Democrat 10 -0.0122
Walker Republican 2 0.0162
Garza Republican 5 -0.0172
Niemeyer Republican 4 0.0179
Gilman Democrat 6 -0.0206
Bowman Republican 8 -0.0236
Clay Democrat 6 0.0246
Selya Republican 1 -0.0254
Dennis Democrat 5 0.0257
Ebel Republican 10 0.0258
Lynch Democrat 1 -0.0258
Wilkinson Republican 4 -0.0261
Edwards Democrat 12 -0.0267
Wiener Republican 5 0.0269
Jones Republican 5 -0.0271
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RANKING OF ALL JUDGES (CONTINUED)
Mean
Opposite Party
Judge Party Circuit -Pool Opposite
McKee Democrat 3 -0.0283
Trott Republican 9 0.0304
Rymer Republican 9 0.0310
Parker Democrat 2 -0.0311
Wollman Republican 8 -0.0318
Wood Democrat 7 -0.0337
Tacha Republican 10 0.0354
Hawkins Democrat 9 -0.0360
Batchelder Republican 6 0.0382
Evans Democrat 7 0.0389
Michael Democrat 4 -0.0392
Tjoflat Republican 11 0.0433
Motz Democrat 4 0.0451
Marcus Democrat 11 -0.0451
Kanne Republican 7 -0.0458
Torruella Republican 1 -0.0470
Benavides Democrat 5 0.0478
Cabranes Democrat 2 0.0492
DeMoss Republican 5 0.0496
Murphy Democrat 8 -0.0506
King Democrat 5 0.0507
Birch Republican 11 -0.0524
Garland Democrat 12 0.0529
Jolly Republican 5 -0.0534
Barksdale Republican 5 0.0567
Hull Democrat 11 0.0572
Sentelle Republican 12 -0.0618
O'Scannlain Republican 9 0.0624
Boggs Republican 6 0.0625
Wilkins Republican 4 0.0627
Ginsburg Republican 12 -0.0655
Loken Republican 8 -0.0681
Luttig Republican 4 0.0707
Rendell Democrat 3 -0.0707
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RANKING JUDGES ACCORDING TO CITATION DIAS
RANKING OF ALL JUDGES (CONTINUED)
Mean
OppositeParty
Judge Party Circuit -Pool .OpPosite
Boudin Republican 1 -0.0710
Randolph Republican 12 -0.0725
Flaum Republican 7 -0.0737
Davis Republican 5 -0.0778
Lucero Democrat 10 -0.0801
Jacobs Republican 2 -0.0827
Tatel Democrat 12 -0.0840
Murphy Democrat 10 -0.0850
Stewart Democrat 5 0.0853
Rovner Republican 7 0.0860
Roth Republican 3 0.0867
Scirica Republican 3 0.0884
Coffey Republican 7 -0.0959
Henderson Republican 12 0.0959
Martin Democrat 6 -0.0983
Nygaard Republican 3 -0.0993
Reinhardt Democrat 9 -0.1024
Barkett Democrat 11 -0.1026
Kelly Republican 10 0.1048
Sloviter Democrat 3 -0.1049
Kozinski Republican 9 -0.1070
Williams Republican 4 -0.1085
Dubina Republican 11 0.1198
Daughtrey Democrat 6 -0.1232
Pregerson Democrat 9 -0.1255
Calabresi Democrat 2 -0.1399
Higginbotham Republican 5 0.1513
Tashima Democrat 9 -0.1545
Anderson Democrat 11 0.1691
Schroeder Democrat 9 -0.1782
Widener Republican . 4_ -0.1903
Nelson Republican 9 -0.1995
Thomas Democrat 9 -0.2755
Note: Analysis performed for only outside circuit citations and pool of
outside circuit opinions.
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RANKING OF DEMOCRATIC JUDGES ONLY
Ranking is based on the difference between the mean Oppo-
siteParty-PoolOpposite score for each judge and the mean Oppo-
siteParty-PoolOpposite score for the median Democratic judge
(Parker) (termed "Adjusted Mean Opposite.Party-PoolOpposite").
Mean Adjusted Mean
OppositeParty- OppositeParty-
Judge Circuit Pool-Opposite Pool-Opposite
Thomas 9 -0.2755 -0.2444
Schroeder 9 -0.1782 -0.1471
Tashima 9 -0.1545 -0.1234
Calabresi 2 -0.1399 -0.1088
Pregerson 9 -0.1255 -0.0944
Daughtrey 6 -0.1232 -0.0921
Sloviter 3 -0.1049 -0.0738
Barkett 11 -0.1026 -0.0715
Reinhardt 9 -0.1024 -0.0713
Martin 6 -0.0983 -0.0672
Murphy 10 -0.0850 -0.0539
Tatel 12 -0.0840 -0.0529
Lucero 10 -0.0801 -0.0490
Rendell 3 -0,0707 -0.0396
Murphy 8 -0.0506 -0.0195
Marcus 11 -0.0451 -0.0140
Michael 4 -0,0392 -0.0081
Hawkins 9 -0.0360 -0.0049
Wood 7 -0.0337 -0.0026
Parker 2 -0.0311 0.0000
McKee 3 -00283 0.0028
Edwards 12 -0.0267 0.0044
Lynch 1 -0.0258 0.0053
Gilman 6 -0.0206 0.0105
Briscoe 10 -0.0122 0.0189
Henry 10 -0.0112 0.0199
Seymour 10 -0.0082 0.0229
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RANKING JUDGES ACCORDING TO CITATION BIAS
RANKING OF DEMOCRATIC JUDGES ONLY (CONTINUED)
Mean Adjusted Mean
OppositeParty- Opposite-Party-
Judge Circuit PooL Opposite PoolOpposite
Moore 6 -0.0055 0.0256
Rogers 12 0.0069 0.0380
Cole 6 0.0083 0.0394
Clay 6 0.0246 0.0557
Dennis 5 0.0257 0.0568
Evans 7 0.0389 0,0700
Motz 4 0.0451 0.0762
Benavides 5 0.0478 0.0789
Cabranes 2 0.0492 0.0803
King 5 0.0507 0.0818
Garland 12 0.0529 0.0840
Hull 11 0.0572 0.0883
Stewart 5 0.0853 0.1164
Anderson 11 0.1691 0.2002
Note: Analysis performed for only outside circuit citations and pool of
outside circuit opinions.
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APPENDIX
RANKING OF REPUBLICAN JUDGES ONLY
Ranking is based on the difference between the mean Oppo-
siteParty-PoolOpposite score for each judge and the mean Oppo-
siteParty-PoolOpposite score for the median Republican judge
(Posner) (termed "Adjusted Mean Opposite-Party-PoolOpposite").
Mean Adjusted Mean
Opposite-Party- OppositeParty-
Judge Circuit Pool Opposite Pool Opposite
Nelson 9 -0.1995 -0.1914
Widener 4 -0.1903 -0.1822
Williams 4 -0.1085 -0.1004
Kozinski 9 -0.1070 -0.0989
Nygaard 3 -0.0993 -0.0912
Coffey 7 -0.0959 -0.0878
Jacobs 2 -0.0827 -0.0746
Davis 5 -0.0778 -0.0697
Flaum 7 -0.0737 -0.0656
Randolph 12 -0.0725 -0.0644
Boudin 1 -0.0710 -0.0629
Loken 8 -0.0681 -0.0600
Ginsburg 12 -0.0655 -0.0574
Sentelle 12 -0.0618 -0.0537
Jolly 5 -0.0534 -0.0453
Birch 11 -0.0524 -0.0443
Torruella 1 -0.0470 -0.0389
Kanne 7 -0.0458 -0.0377
Wollman 8 -0.0318 -0.0237
Jones 5 -0.0271 -0.0190
Wilkinson 4 -0.0261 -0.0180
Selya 1 -0.0254 -0.0173
Bowman 8 -0.0236 -0.0155
Garza 5 -0.0172 -0.0091
Kleinfeld 9 -0.0120 -0.0039
Posner 7 -0.0081 0.0000
Edmondson 11 -0.0066 0.0015
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RANKING JUDGES ACCORDING TO CITATION BIAS
RANKING OF REPUBLICAN JUDGES ONLY (CONTINUED)
Mean Adjusted Mean
Oposite Party- Opposite Party-
Ju dge Circuit PoolOpposite Pool pposite
Arnold 8 -0.0060 0.0021
Aito 3 -0.0059 0.0022
Black 11 -0.0031 0.0050
Carnes 11 -0.0007 0.0074
Ripple 7 -0.0007 0.0074
Easterbrook 7 0.0047 0.0128
Smith 5 0.0060 0.0141
Manion 7 0.0085 0.0166
Walker 2 0.0162 0.0243
Niemeyer 4 0.0179 0.0260
Ebel 10 0.0258 0.0339
Wiener 5 0.0269 0.0350
Trott 9 0.0304 0.0385
Rymer 9 0.0310 0.0391
Tacha 10 0.0354 0.0435
Batchelder 6 0.0382 0.0463
Tjoflat 11 0.0433 0.0514
DeMoss 5 0.0496 0.0577
Barksdale 5 0.0567 0.0648
O'Scannlain 9 0.0624 0.0705
Boggs 6 0.0625 0.0706
Wilkins 4 0.0627 0.0708
Luttig 4 0.0707 0.0788
Rovner 7 0.0860 0.0941
Roth 3 0.0867 0.0948
Scirica 3 0.0884 0.0965
Henderson 12 0.0959 0.1040
Kelly 10 0.1048 0.1129
Dubina 11 0.1198 0.1279
LHigginbotham 5 0.1513 0.1594
Note: Analysis performed for only outside circuit
outside circuit opinions.
citations and pool of
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